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I. INTRODUCTION

Grotian Moment is a term that signifies a "paradigm-shifting
development in which new rules and doctrines of customary international
law emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance."' A Grotian Moment is
thus "an instance in which a fundamental change in the exiting international
system happens, thereby provoking the emergence of a new principle of
customary law with outstanding speed." 2 Professor Richard Falk invented
the term Grotian Moment in 1985. Since then, the term has been employed
by experts in a variety of ways.3 Here, I will adopt the following meaning
of Grotian Moment as proposed by Professor Michael Scharf:
"a
transformative development in which new rules and doctrines of customary
international law emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance."A This
article will examine whether the concept of humanitarian intervention,
developed over the past two decades, constitutes an instance of a Grotian
Moment. In particular, this article will focus on Syria and the recent
arguments in favor of humanitarian intervention in this region, and will
pose the question of whether Syria constitutes a law-creating moment. This
article will conclude that Syria may contribute to the shaping of a new
Grotian Moment: the development of humanitarian intervention as a norm
of customary law.

*
The Charles R. Emrick Jr.-Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law, ClevelandMarshall College of Law. The author would like to thank the organizers of the 2013 International Law
Weekend for the opportunity to present these remarks.

I.
Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the "Grotian Moment" Accelerated Formation of Customary
Int'l Law in Time ofFundamentalChange, 43 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 439, 439 (2010).
2.
Milena Sterio, A Grotian Moment: Changes in the Legal Theory of Statehood, 39 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 209, 211 (2011).
3.

Id

4.

Scharf, supranote 1,at 444.
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II. WHAT ISA GROTIAN MOMENT?
The term "Grotian" refers to Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius (15831645), who is hailed as the father of modern international law, and who, in
his seminal work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and Peace),
"offered a new concept of international law designed to reflect that new
reality."5 Similar to how Grotius developed a novel understanding of
international law in the seventeenth century, more modem events have
constituted Grotian Moments over the last several decades.
Thus,
commentators have suggested that the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal
at the end of World War II was a Grotian Moment.6 Moreover, the
establishment of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter could constitute another
example of a Grotian Moment.7 Finally, the recent establishment of the
International Criminal Court could provide an additional instance of a
Grotian Moment.
Over time, scholars have used other terms to convey the idea of a
Grotian Moment. Professors Bruce Ackerman, Bardo Fassbender, Jenny
Martinez, Leila Sadat, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and William Burke-White
have all used the term "constitutional moment" to refer to different
developments in American constitutional law and in international law. 9
The term "international constitutional moment" may be distinguished from
the concept of Grotian Moment as the latter reflects a wider-ranging

5.
Id. at 443; see generally Hugo Grotius, The Law of War andPeace, LONANG.COM (May
2012), http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/grotius (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).
6.
See generally Ibrahim J. Gassama, InternationalLaw at a Grotian Moment: The Invasion
ofIraq in Context, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1, 9 (2004) (arguing that along the Peace of Westphalia, the
Nuremberg Charter and the U.N. Charter include more recent Grotian moments).
7.

Id.

8.
Leila Nadya Sadat, The New InternationalCriminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88
GEO. L. J. 381, 474 (2000).
9.
See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984) (referring
to the New Deal era as a "constitutional moment"); Bardo Fassbender, The UnitedNations Charteras
Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1998); Jenny S.
Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicialSystem, 56 STAN. L. REv. 429, 463 (2003) (referring to the
drafting of the U.N. Charter as a "constitutional moment" in the history of international law); Leila
Nadya Sadat, Enemy Combatants After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: ExtraordinaryRendition, Torture, and
OtherNightmaresfrom the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1200, 1206-07 (2007) (referring to
Nuremberg as a "constitutional moment"); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An
International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (2002) (referring to 9/11 as a
"constitutional moment" and arguing that the attacks reflect a change in the nature of threats facing the
international community, justifying the development of new rules of customary law).
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development affecting international law on the whole, and not merely
subfields of international law.' 0
Finally, the notion of a Grotian Moment can also be distinguished
from the concept of "instant customary international law."" This theory
argues that state practice may not be a necessary element in the
establishment and creation of customary law if states' opinio juris on an
emerging norm can be clearly demonstrated through their General
Assembly resolutions.12 On the contrary, customary international law is
formed through gradual, widespread, and lengthy state practice and a sense
of legal obligation to comply with the emerging norm." Thus, the process
of establishing such a norm of customary international law can take many
decades or even centuries.14 The Grotian Moment theory is distinct from
the theory of instant customary law because it looks beyond General
Assembly resolutions and focuses on paradigmatic changes in international
law caused by rapid and profound global developments.
The "Grotian Moment" concept contemplates accelerated formation of
customary international law through widespread acquiescence or
endorsement in response to State acts, rather than instant custom based
solely on General Assembly resolutions. 15 The Grotian Moment theory
may rely on General Assembly resolutions to discover evidence of an
emerging customary law norm, resulting from a period of fundamental
change. However, General Assembly resolutions are one of the many tools
utilized by scholars discovering a Grotian Moment.
[T]he "Grotian Moment" concept may be helpful to a court
examining whether a particular General Assembly resolution
should be deemed evidence of an embryonic rule of customary
international law, especially in a case lacking the traditional level

10.
Scharf supranote 1, at 445 (describing that a Grotian Moment "makes more sense when
speaking of a development that has an effect on international law at large").
11.
Sterio, supra note 2, at 212 (citing PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN
INTRODUCTION To INT'L LAW 45-46 (7th ed. 1997); B. Cheng, United NationalResolutions on Outer
Space: "Instant" International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965)); Jeremy Levitt,
HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases ofECOWAS in Liberia
and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333, 351 (1998): see generally Benjamin Lengille, It's
"Instant Custom:" How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
2001, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 145 (2003).
12.

Cheng, supranote 11, at 36.

13.

Scharf, supra note 1, at 445.

14.
See e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (The U.S. Supreme Court
recognized in this case that the process of forming customary international law can take centuries.).
15.

Scharf, supranote 1, at 446.

ILSA JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

346

[Vol. 20:2

of widespread and repeated state practice. In periods of
fundamental change-whether by technological advances, the
commission of new forms of crimes against humanity, or the
development of new means of warfare or terrorism-rapidly
developing customary international law as crystallized in General
Assembly resolutions may be necessary for international law to
keep up with the pace of other developments.' 6
As mentioned above, historical examples of Grotian Moments include
the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal at the end of World War H, as well
as the establishment of the U.N. in 1945.7 More recent examples include
the creation of the International Criminal Court.'8 Additionally, the
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11,
2001 have significantly impacted the international community's
understanding of the laws of war. 9 In the wake of the September 11
attacks, Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, which confirmed the
right to use force in self-defense against non-state actors (al-Qaeda),
thereby confirming the idea that international law authorizes states to use
force in self-defense against non-state actors.20
A lesser known Grotian Moment may consist of the situation when the
United States and Soviet Union initially "developed the ability to launch
rockets into outer space and place satellites in earth orbit." 2' Responding to
this development, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Declaration of Legal
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, which confirmed that the U.N. Charter generally applies to
outer space, as well as attempted to limit states' ability to lay territorial
claims to parts of outer space.2 2 This Declaration was widely accepted as
16.

Scharf, supra note 1, at 450.

17.

Sterio, supranote 2, at 2011-12.

18.

See generally supranotes 6-8 and accompanying text.

19.
See e.g., British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Order out of Chaos: The Future of
Afghanistan, Address at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (Oct. 22, 2001), quoted in
Slaughter, Burke-White, supra note 9, at 2 (According to then British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw,
"[flew events in global history can have galvanized the international system to action so completely in
so short a time.").
20.
See generally U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001) (Calling
on states to "work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors" of the
attacks, and reaffirming the inherent right of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, in the zontext of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.).
21.

Scharf, supra note 1, at 450.

22.
See generally Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIll), 1280th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/1962 (Dec. 13 1963).
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law and reflected a time of change caused by accelerated technological
developments, such as the possibility to launch rockets into outer space. 23
Finally, the development of humanitarian intervention at the very end
of the twentieth century has been described as a Grotian Moment.2 4 In
1999, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces intervened in
Serbia to protect ethnic Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing, instituted
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia government.2 5 The NATO
campaign had not been authorized by the U.N., but the global consensus on
this intervention was that it was "[unlawful] but legitimate."26 The
international community responded to the intervention through a new
doctrine called "Responsibility to Protect," which authorizes humanitarian
.
. *27
interventions
in limited
circumstances.
A growing number of scholars
have agreed that humanitarian intervention has become an emerging norm
of customary international law, and that it ought to be recognized in some
extraordinary circumstances.28
Thus, the notion of humanitarian
intervention may have constituted a Grotian Moment. This is particularly
relevant today in the context of Syria and the ongoing humanitarian crisis,
which has sparked significant debate over the issue of humanitarian
intervention.
23.

See Sterio, supranote 2, at 214.

24.

See Scharf,supra note 1, at 450.

25.
Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: "Selfistans," Secession, and
the GreatPowers 'Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 137, 163-64 (2010).
26.
This terminology was coined by the drafters of the Kosovo Report. See INDEP. INT'L
COMM'N ON Kosovo, Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INT'L RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED, ch. 6 (2000)
[hereinafter Kosovo COMM'N]. The position of the U.S. Government confirmed this view; a few days
before the start of the NATO-led aerial strikes against the former Yugoslavia in 1999, a spokesman from
the U.S. State Department stated that "[w]e and our NATO allies have looked to numerous factors in
concluding that such action, if necessary, would be justified . . . ." And that "we and our NATO allies
believe there are legitimate grounds to threaten and, if necessary, use military force." Sean Murphy,
ContemporaryPractice of the United States Relating to Int'l Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 631 (1999);
but see the position of the United Kingdom's Government: "We are in doubt that NATO is acting
within international law and our legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be
used in extreme circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe." DUKE, EHRHART & KARADI, The
Major European Allies: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, in KOSOvO AND THE CHALLENGE
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 128 (Schnabel & Thakur eds., 2000) [hereinafter KOSOVO AND THE
CHALLENGE].
27.

See generally THE INT'L COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE

RESPONSIBILITY

TO

PROTECT

(2001),

available

at

http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/

ICISS%2OReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT]; see also Max W.

Mathews, Note, Tracking the Emergence of a New Int'l Norm: The Responsibility to Protect and the
Crisis in Darfur,31 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV. 137 (2008).
28.

See John Alan Cohan, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 907, 941

(2006); MARC WELLER, ARMED SAMARITANS 20-22 (Counsel 1999).
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III. SYRIA: A VIOLENT PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE?

Syria is a multi-ethnic nation, home to a majority of Arab Sunnis and
many other minority groups such as Arab Alawites, Christians, Armenians,
Assyrians, Druze, Kurds, and Turks.29 It was a part of the Ottoman Empire
from the 16th century until World War I.3o After the War Syria was
integrated into the French mandate in the Middle East.
It gained
independence from France in 1946, but its first decades as a sovereign
nation were marred by violence and conflict.32 Following a regional war in
1970, Hafez al-Assad, current President Assad's father, rose to power and
emerged as ruler of Syria.33 Violence and warfare ensued throughout Hafez
al-Assad's regime. In the late 1970s, an Islamic uprising orchestrated by
the Muslim Brotherhood and aimed against the government resulted in
further violence, culminating in the 1982 Hama Massacre, where tens of
thousands of Syrians were killed by the Syrian army. 34 Hafez al-Assad died
in 2000 and was replaced by his son, Bashar al-Assad, who ran unopposed
for the presidential post.3 5
Bashar al-Assad's election initially sparked hope for reform, but his
regime quickly quashed any protest.36 The current crisis began as part of
the Arab Spring: A series of peaceful protests that took place in Syria in
the spring of 2011, to be brutally quashed by the Syrian army.37 By the
summer of 2011, army defectors formed the Free Syrian Army and began
fighting against government forces.
The opposition movement is
dominated by Sunnis, whereas Assad and the governing regime are mostly
Alawites. 38 According to some reports, as many as 100,000 people have
been killed in this bloody conflict, whereas over 1.5 million Syrians have
29.
See Syria Profile, BBC NEWS MIDDLE EAST (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-middle-east-14703856 (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Syria Profile].
30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

See Syria Profile, supra note 29.

35.

Id.

36.
Id. ("Following the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000 Syria underwent a brief period of
relaxation. Hundreds of political prisoners were released, but real political freedoms and a shake-up of
the state-dominated economy never materialized.").
37.

See generally id.

38.
Kim Sengupta, Syria's Sectarian War Goes Int'l as Foreign Fighters and Arms Pour Into
Country, INDEPDENDENT.CO.UK (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/syrias-sectarian-war-goes-intemational-as-foreign-fighters-and-arms-pour-into-country7216665.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).
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fled to the neighboring countries of Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon.
Recently, the conflict escalated resulting in the use of particularly heinous
weapons by the Syrian government. In August 2013, President Assad
allegedly used chemical weapons against Syrian civilians; as confirmed by
U.N. inspectors.40
The ongoing crisis situates itself perfectly within the ongoing situation
in Syria, where all constitutional and democratic freedoms and values have
been lacking. While Syria is officially a constitutional democracy, all
constitutional freedoms were suspended between 1963 and 2011 under an
Emergency Law, because of the ongoing conflict with Israel over Golan
Heights.4 1 Most human rights observers have expressed serious concern
over Syria's human rights record, calling it one of the worst on the planet.42
The current conflict has only exacerbated an already volatile situation.
Syrian demographics have additionally fueled the ongoing conflict. A
majority of Syrians (approximately 60%) are Sunni Arab; President Assad
and his government belong to a minority Alawite group (approximately
12%); Christians constitute a 10% minority; other minority groups such as
Turks, Kurds, and Assyrians constitute the remaining 18% of the
population.43 Christians have aligned themselves with the ruling Alawites,
from whom they have expected protection from the more radical Islamic
Sunnis. Many Christians, alongside Alawites, hold prominent posts within
Syria." Most Christians have thus supported Assad throughout the conflict

39.
Matthew Weaver, Syria Crisis: Number of Refugees Tops 1.5 Million, Says UN, THE
GUARDIAN (May 16, 2003), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/16/syria-crisis-refugeesmillion-un (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).
40.
Syria Chemical Attack:
What We Know, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23927399 (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); see also Report of
the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian
Arab Republic on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus, Aug. 21,
2013, U.N. Doc. A/67/997-S/2013/553, available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/
slideshow/Secretary GeneralReportof CW Investigation.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
41.
Syria's Emergency Law Lifted After 48 Years, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA BLOG (Apr.
19, 2011), http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2011/04/syrias-emergency-law-lifted-48-years-editor (last
visited Feb. 20, 2014).
42.
See
Freedom
in
the
World
2011,
FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG
http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world201 l?page=363&year-201 1&country-8143 (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).

(2011),

43.
Syria
Demographics
Profile
2013,
INDEXMUNDI.COM
(2013),
http://www.indexmundi.com/syria/demographicsjprofile.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (citing CIA
WORLD FACTBOOK).

44.
Syria's Christians Stand by Assad, CBS NEWS (Feb. 6, 2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-503543_162-57372175-503543/syrias-christians-stand-by-assad/
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014)
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and have argued that if Assad were removed, the dominant Sunnis would
install an Islamic-extremist government which would harm Christians and
all other minority groups even further.4 5 The presence of multiple ethnic
groups in Syria, as well as their mutual alliances and skirmishes, have
contributed to historical instability of the Syrian state and have exacerbated
the present-day civil war.
In the wake of horrific violence and bloodshed in Syria, and in
particular, the allegations of chemical weapons used by the Assad regime,
the international community has grappled with the issue of whether to
intervene with military in this volatile region. The U.N. Security Council
has been blocked over the issue because both Russia and China have
threatened to veto any resolution calling for military action against Syria.46
The United States briefly attempted to build consensus over the idea of
staging a unilateral intervention in Syria, alongside allies such as Great
Britain and France.47 The section below will explore the issue of
humanitarian intervention post-Syria, and whether this emerging norm
constitutes a Grotian Moment.
IV. A NEW GROTIAN MOMENT: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION?
Any unilateral military action against Syria exercised without Security
Council approval constitutes a use of force that can be best justified through
the paradigm of humanitarian intervention: This concept is an emerging
norm of customary law that is currently being crystallized into binding law.
The creation of any norm of customary law requires two elements: opinio
juris and state practice.4 8 State action and practice aimed at the creation of
a new norm of customary law may in fact break an existing norm. In other
words, states may have to engage in behavior which purposely violates
existing rules in order to create new, presumably better rules. For the
("Thousands of Christians are tied up in the regime's security apparatus and are employed in highranking government and military positions.").
45.
Id. ("As a fellow minority, Christians have long supported the Alawite regime in order to
ensure protection and rights for themselves.").
46.
Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, U.N. Security Council Powers Meet Again on
Syria; No Outcome, REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-syriacrisis-un-idUSBRE97Sl7R20130829 (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (noting that Russia and China had
vetoed three proposed resolutions that would have condemned the Assad regime and threatened United
Nations sanctions).
47.
Id. (noting that the United States and Great Britain sought to convince the public for the
need to engage in military strikes against Syria); see also France's Hollande Backs US. on Syria
Action, BBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23897775 (last
visited Feb. 20, 2014).
48.

See Scharf supranote 1, at 445.
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purposes of Syria, this implies that states may have to engage in military
intervention for a humanitarian purpose without Security Council approval,
thereby breaking the existing ban on the use of force in order to establish a
new customary norm of humanitarian intervention.
In the context of Syria, the argument in favor of humanitarian
intervention is solid. In the words of Harold Koh, "Syria is a lawmaking
moment" because all the conditions seem to be met for the advancement of
a novel legal argument: that humanitarian intervention has crystallized into
a new binding norm of international law. 4 9 Thus, the emergence of
humanitarian intervention as a new norm of customary law, as evidenced
post-Syria, may constitute a Grotian Moment, similar to those described
above. According to Koh, humanitarian intervention could be legal under
international law if the following conditions were met:
1)

If a humanitarian crisis creates consequences significantly
disruptive of internationalorder-including proliferation of

chemical weapons, massive refugee outflows, and events
destabilizing to regional peace and security of the regionthat would likely soon create an imminent threat to the
acting nations (which would give rise to an urgent need to
act in individual and collective self-defense under Article
5 1);

2)

3)

[A] Security Council resolution was not available because
of persistent veto; and the group of nations that had
persistently sought Security Council action had exhausted
all other remedies reasonably available under the
circumstances, they would not violate U.N. Charter Article
2(4) if they used [ ... ]
[L]imited force for genuinely humanitarianpurposes that

was necessary and proportionate to address the imminent
threat would demonstrably improve the humanitarian
situation, and would terminate as soon as the threat is
abated.so
Over the past few decades, humanitarian intervention has grown from
a hawkish argument, advanced by few, to a powerfully emerging norm of
customary law. Evidence to support the emergence of this norm cannot be
ignored; moreover, the emergence of such a norm is a necessity in today's
type of warfare: where conflict is more often intra-state than inter-state,
49.
See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of HumanitarianIntervention (Part11: Int'l
Law and the Way Forward), JuSTSECURITY.ORG (Oct. 2, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/
10/02/koh-syria-part2/(last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
50.

Id. (emphasis in original).
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and where civilians represent targets more frequently than soldiers. First,
both opinio juris and state practice have slowly been turning toward
approval of humanitarian intervention as a new norm of customary law. In
the context of Kosovo in 1999, many states were ready and willing to
participate in a NATO-led military intervention, outside of the confines of
the U.N. Charter. While some states, including the United States, attempted
to paint this intervention as sui generis and not precedent-creating, others
more openly admitted to their belief that this type of action was indeed
justified under international law.'
Moreover, even states which denied that Kosovo was any type of a
new precedent-setting norm nonetheless participated in this military
intervention. State practice in the case of Kosovo points to the emergence
of a new norm of customary law, namely humanitarian intervention. As the
Independent International Commission on Kosovo pointed out, "[t]he
Kosovo 'exception' now exists, for better and worse, as a contested
precedent that must be assessed in relation to a wide range of international
effects and undertakings."5 2 In addition, then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan has claimed, in the aftermath of Kosovo, that "[e]merging slowly,
but I believe surely, is an international norm against the violent repression
of minorities that will and must take precedence over concerns of State
sovereignty." 5 3 Other examples of humanitarian intervention over the
course of the last two decades include a 1999 intervention on behalf of the
Kurds staged by the United States and exercised against Iraq, as well as the
2012 intervention in Libya.54 In addition to such examples of humanitarian

51.
Compare the United Kingdom's position on Kosovo, arguing that the NATO intervention
was legal under international law, with the position of the United States, which argued that the
intervention was "legitimate." See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 42; see also Kosovo COMMISSION,
supra note 26.
52.

Kosovo COMMISSION, supranote 26, at 175.

53.
See Press Release, Human Rights Commission, Secretary-General Calls for Renewed
Commitment in New Century to Protect Rights of Man, Woman, Child-Regardless of Ethnic, National
Belonging, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6949, HR/CN/898 (Apr. 7,1999).
54.
Sterio, supra note 25, at 156 (discussing the 1991 intervention on behalf of the Kurds).
While military intervention in Libya had been authorized through Security Council Resolution 1973, the
action itself was exercised by a coalition of nineteen states and involvement by NATO. Although Libya
does not represent an instance of humanitarian intervention absent Security Council authorization, it
does illustrate the willingness of multiple states to participate in a military intervention to protect
civilians from humanitarian suffering. See e.g., Qatar, Several EU States Up for Libya Action:
Diplomat, EUBUSINESS.COM (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eullibya-unrestsummit.95v/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); see also Libya Example Shows UN Resolution on Syria Might
be Used to Justify Broad Intervention, RT.COM (Sept. 24, 2013), http://rt.com/op-edge/libya-un-broadintervention-277/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (noting that Resolution 1973 "was presented as a
humanitarian resolution").
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intervention, the international community has grappled with this issue and
many states have indicated their willingness to develop a new norm
authorizing military action against rogue regimes.
Many such discussions have already occurred within the context of
responsibility to protect. While the existing document on responsibility to
protect places any military intervention within the purview of the Security
Council, many states' willingness to debate this issue and to question the
Security Council's monopoly in this area demonstrates an emergence or
crystallization of a new way of thinking. Humanitarian intervention has
been present in the public discussions of many states and on the agenda of
the U.N. General Assembly. The absence of consensus on this issue does
not demonstrate that states do not wish to develop a new normative
framework for humanitarian intervention; however, such lack of consensus
indicates that states take this issue very seriously and may be in the process
of cooperating toward the development of a new norm. Second, modernday warfare necessitates the development of a new norm authorizing
military intervention in situations where the Security Council is deadlocked
and where humanitarian suffering becomes intolerable. Most recent wars
have been internal and have involved large civilian populations.55
Unfortunately, Security Council politics have resulted in multiple vetoes
and only a small number of military actions have ever been authorized.
Civilian populations need the international community's protection, and
such protection can only be offered if a normative framework for true
humanitarian intervention is developed.
Syria may be the perfect
opportunity to do so. The framework mentioned above, proposed by
Harold Koh in the context of Syria, accomplishes the important task of
legalizing humanitarian intervention under very strict, limited
circumstances.
This type of limited humanitarian intervention may
constitute a new Grotian Moment.
Koh is correct in developing and advancing the argument in favor of
humanitarian intervention. Customary norms of law emerge through novel
legal arguments, and through states' acceptance and usage of such
arguments. The only way that humanitarian intervention can develop into a
binding norm of customary law is through the writing of scholars like Koh,
which can then be espoused by political leaders and put into frequent use. I
also agree with Koh that humanitarian intervention is a necessity in today's
world-because, like in Syria, modern-day conflicts often remain within a
single state's boundary and often cause tremendous humanitarian suffering.
55.
See e.g., James Mayall, The Concept of HumanitarianIntervention Revisited, in KOSOVO
AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 26, at 320 (noting that since the Gulf War, the majority of conflict
were intrastate conflicts, necessitating U.N. Chapter VI intervention to provide humanitarian relief as
well as peacekeeping functions).
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Because Security Council remains deadlocked over geo-political interests
of its permanent members, it is essential that the international community
become enabled to act without its explicit approval. The hope here is that
humanitarian intervention can someday morph from an emerging norm of
international law into a binding one. That customary law will evolve and
will embrace this new norm. That the Security Council structure of veto
power can be overcome one day through such development of binding
custom, and that we will witness the creation of a new Grotian Moment.
The emergence of a new customary norm of international law, and the
creation of a new Grotian Moment, is of course a difficult proposition.
How does one "prove" that customary law contains a new norm? How
does one demonstrate the exact content of that norm? Academics,
politicians, judges, and arbitrators have already grappled with the idea of
proving the existence and content of a customary law norm. They have
looked to the traditional sources of international law: Treaties, writings of
scholars, judicial opinions, and general principles of law. They have
reviewed U.N. sources, such as Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions, soft law instruments, such as codes of conduct, guidelines,
gentlemen's agreements, and various political statements. They have
browsed through supporting and interpretative documents, such as travaux
preparatoires, legislative history behind national statutes, and drafting
history and drafters' statements linked to any international document.
Anyone looking for the emergence of a new customary norm of
humanitarian intervention would look in similar places. It is thus important
that the proposed framework for the legality of humanitarian intervention
become a part of international legal discourse. That it continue to be
discussed at academic forums and conferences. That it remain a subject of
controversy on the Security Council and General Assembly agenda, and
that it persist to occupy a sore subject of political and diplomatic
negotiation. The development of any new legal rule requires tenacity and
persistence. Developing a legal framework for humanitarian intervention
will similarly require significant effort; it is too important of a task however
to justify giving up. With persistence and tenacity by states, scholars, and
courts eager to develop a new norm of humanitarian intervention, we may
soon become able to observe another fully-shaped Grotian Moment.
Last, I understand that humanitarian intervention can be a slippery
slope-that states may attempt to misuse this rationale to justify aggressive
military action and the use of force for selfish, national interests under the
guise of humanitarian assistance. But any law can be potentially misused,
misinterpreted, or wrongly applied. This is not an argument in favor of
doing nothing. At best, it is an argument in favor of adding to Koh's
proposed framework. One such addition may be a requirement that any
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state engaged in a unilateral humanitarian intervention report back to the
Security Council. Such a reporting mechanism already exists within the
U.N. Charter for the exercise of self-defense; it would be equally valid for
the humanitarian intervention paradigm.
Another addition may be a requirement that a state considering the use
of force for humanitarian purposes attempt to build an international
coalition. Although the Security Council may be paralyzed, it would
nonetheless be possible for the intervener state to seek allies. The United
States attempted to do so when it first considered the possibility of using
force against Syria-President Obama sought British and French
assistance.56 The Bush Administration's response to the 9/11 terrorist
attacks also centered on building an international coalition of states willing
to combat terrorism. 5 7 And the Kosovo air strikes, conducted with a
humanitarian goal, were led by a NATO coalition of states.5 8 The existence
of an international alliance in most instances demonstrates that multiple
states are concerned with a given situation and that multiple states consider
the use of force appropriate. The requirement that states build or attempt to
build an international coalition any time they wish to engage in
humanitarian intervention could prevent individual states from staging
military actions with non-humanitarian goals under the pretext of
humanitarian intervention.
Finally, it should be noted that international law is not stagnant and
that it has evolved and changed drastically over the past century. Thus, if
some day humanitarian intervention becomes an unnecessary, ill-used,
cumbersome norm, international law players can act in order to change the
norm. If rogue states misuse the norm and engage in reprehensible military
actions under the pretense of humanitarian assistance, the international
community can reevaluate and reinterpret the norm, or can pass treaty
provisions to overturn the norm. International law has evolved because of
changes in our society and the need to preserve international peace and
security in a different manner. Similarly, international law can change in
the future, to respond to distinct future needs of our global community.

56.

Syria Demographics Profile, supra note 43; see also Charbonneau & Nichols supra, note

46.
57.
Sarah Anderson, Phyllis Bennis & John Cavanagh, Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of
the Coerced?, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES
(Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.ipsdc.org/reports/coalition-of the-willing (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (describing the building of the
Coalition of the Willing by the Bush Administration in the wake of 9/1 1).
58.
See e.g., Sterio, supra note 25, at 156 (discussing the NATO air strikes against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia aimed at protecting Kosovar Albanians).
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V. CONCLUSION
As scholars have acknowledged, "[c]ommentator's and courts should
exercise caution, however, in characterizing situations as Grotian
Moments" as most instances of profound change may need to be more
strictly scrutinized to determine if they truly qualify as Grotian Moments.5 9
While the issue of humanitarian intervention certainly merits continuous
attention and scrutiny on behalf of states, scholars, and courts, the
development of this new norm of international law authorizing the use of
force toward the goal of preventing humanitarian suffering would be a
significant and worthy Grotian Moment. In the wake of the Syrian
situation, we may be witnessing the development and creation of a new
Grotian Moment: the emergence of a customary norm of international law
authorizing humanitarian intervention.

59.

Scharf, supranote 1, at 452.

